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Abstract 
The modern food supply chain is assuming many roles traditionally associated with 
markets. This paper reviews efforts to define food supply chains and define and meas-
ure their performance from a commercial and social point of view. It proposes that 
little thought has been given to the role of government in food supply chains and the 
degree to which the existing policy environment is appropriate for the productive 
growth of such chains. It examines potential supply chain performance measures that 
might be used by policy makers, and the extent to which the appropriate information 
might be shared between the chain and government. It presents conclusions about 
necessary steps for policy development and for governments’ relations with both 
firms and chains. Further research topics are identified.  
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Preface 
This Working Paper addresses the rapid development of the food supply chain and the 
relevance of existing policy mechanisms to that changed environment. This research 
is conducted under the auspices of the project “Perspektiver for og Udvikling af den 
danske fødevarekæde (phase 2)”, commonly known as “the food chain project”. This 
project is funded under the Inovationslov and administered by the Directorate of Food 
Fisheries and Agribusiness (DFFE) of the Danish Ministry of Agriculture. 
 
Thanks are due to Jørgen Dejgård Jensen for a review of drafts of the paper.  
 
 
 
 
Division Director, Production and Technology, Mogens Lund 
Institute of Food and Resource Economics 
Copenhagen, December 2007 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Purpose of study 
This study addresses issues of food industry policy in the context of modern food and 
agribusiness supply chains. It has three target audiences: 
• Government practitioners of policy will gain some insight into the way in which 
the shifting nexus of food industry activity might be addressed in pursuit of pol-
icy goals; 
• Researchers into policy and the economics of the food system will find a selec-
tion of literature reviewed and utilised to pose questions about current and future 
supply chain policies; and 
• Food industry firms will improve their understanding of the purposes of policy 
and its possible future mechanisms in an increasingly chain-oriented commercial 
environment. 
1.2. Background 
The food system’s progression toward vertical co-ordination has been variously at-
tributed to numerous factors including available technologies (Boehlje and Sonka, 
1998), transactions costs (Frank and Henderson, 1992), information exchange issues 
between firms (Hennessy, 1996), and the need to reflect consumer demand through-
out the chain (Price, 2002; King and Pomphiu, 1996). Hughes (2002) describes the 
food system as “a channel to the consumer”, in which various value-addition and 
value-delivery mechanisms are engaged. In this setting, Maxwell and Slater (2003) 
identify a “new food policy” with a broadened remit, including that of addressing co-
ordinated vertical structures and relationships. The current paper embraces “new food 
policy” instruments and examines issues of their design and implementation in the 
context of a food supply chain.  
 
Jackson et al. (2006) synthesise various chain-relevant views in terms of their impact 
on policy and vice-versa. Although much contemporary policy addresses market fail-
ure and the associated roles of government towards the firm and the market, this sub-
ject has rarely been addressed in the context of supply chains. The chains are likely to 
generate a different pattern of market failures than do firms: in particular by solving 
some problems while generating others. The current paper makes one of the first at-
tempts to identify a role of government associated with the food supply chain.  
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In the view of some, narrow food marketing channels are a means of exercising mar-
ket power (Marsden et al., 1997) as well as a consequence of it (Cotterill, 1997).1  
Others view the process as a consequence or means of specialisation, or of activities 
generating specific quality attributes (Meulenberg and Viaenne, 2002). The phe-
nomenon of a single firm dominating a channel has been dubbed “chain captaincy” by 
Connor (2003). Hanf and Dautzenberg (2006) identified the emergence of a chain 
captain (which they refer to as the “focal firm”) with some key desirable aspects of 
food supply chain management. Other benefits of (retail) chain captaincy have been 
described by Dobson et al. (2004), in the form of a virtuous circle/cycle of low price 
based on low costs, subsequent acquisition of market share, re-investment of profits 
into further scale, which in turn lowers costs. Much of the scale-related cost saving 
may be in input-sourcing, which has been the site of much recent industrial consolida-
tion throughout Europe (Baker, 2003), and continues to occupy policy institutions.2   
 
In a chain-dominated food economy, competition is thought to be increasingly “be-
tween chains rather than between firms” (Boehlje and Sonka, 1998). However, access 
to the chains has become a policy concern across contexts as diverse as access for 
small farmers (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000) and the demise of second-tier or local 
brands (Borghesani et al., 1999). Within the chain, narrow channels appear to be con-
ducive to non-competitive behaviour, such as predatory branding (Baker et al., 2006). 
Whereas much industrial organisation-oriented work in the food industry addresses 
vertical integration, in fact the management tools being employed are best referred to 
as “vertical co-ordination” (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2000; Xu and Beamon, 2006). The 
current paper examines these issues in terms of a role of government and appropriate 
policies: for example, a co-ordination role of government in vertical relations such as 
quality certification may be outmoded and unproductive in some supply chains but 
may be a fundamental enabling factor in others. 
 
Based on supply chain development, Moran and Ghoshal (1999) identify a shift away 
from markets toward quite different relationships amongst firms, stating “we live in 
an organisational economy, not a market economy”. This raises questions about the 
relevance of policy instruments that are focused on mimicking market-based effi-
ciency. A further concern about policy is its capacity to address all stages of the 
chain. Hallsworth and Taylor (1996) identify close relationships between government 
                                                 
1 Cotterill uses the term “food convergence” to describe narrowing in supply chains and the envi-
ronment.  
2 See OECD (1999, 2003) for a review; and Duffy et al. (2003) for an investigation of the “fairness” 
of the retailer-supplier interface. 
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and firms in identifying interlocking “circuits of power”. Jackson et al. (2006) list 
policy initiatives in Britain that promoted the interests of the “commodity chain”, but 
specifically targeted issues of competitiveness and costs within the chain,3 and paid 
far less attention to stakeholder welfare, the environment and sustainability. A more 
acerbic treatment of chain development in Britain is presented by Lucas and Jones (an 
undated political treatise), which extends to criticisms of chain-related declines in 
farm diversification, global trade and specialisation patterns, degeneration of rural so-
ciety, pollution, overuse of fossil fuels, and a disconnection between localities and the 
food products that they produce. Although, across a number of disciplines, much re-
search effort is being devoted to defining and measuring food supply chain perform-
ance, there is a divergence amongst definitions of that performance. This is due not 
only to the usual dichotomy of views contrasting “economic” with “financial” per-
formance, but also to the capacity of performance measures to address or take account 
of the interests of all members of the supply chain. The current paper provides one of 
the first discussions of these topics. 
 
Most advocates of supply chain performance measurement emphasise the principle of 
define-quantify-benchmark-compare. They also require the key step of identifying 
measurable variables (“metrics”). However, within this literature has appeared a ma-
jor divergence in research aims: one body of work measures the performance of firms 
within the supply chain; while the other measures the performance of the supply chain 
itself. The current study primarily addresses the latter, and the manner in which policy 
can monitor and enhance performance. Stewart (1995) identifies the conflict between 
corporate and supply chain performance as stakeholders’ asking “what’s in it for 
me?” when entering a supply chain. More generally, the extent to which current 
knowledge of food industry policy addresses incentives within, between and beyond 
supply chains is unclear. Government’s role in the modern supply chain has not been 
widely discussed, but for a variety of such roles, few have addressed the question of 
“what’s in it for society?” 
1.3. The “Food Chain Project” 
This research is conducted under the auspices of the project4 “Perspektiver for og Ud-
vikling af den danske fødevarekæde (phase 2)”,5 commonly known as “the food chain 
project”. This project is funded under the Inovationslov and administered by the Di-
                                                 
3 See also MAFF (1999). 
4 Further information about the project are available from the author at db@foi.dk. 
5 “Perspectives and outlook for the Danish food marketing chain”. 
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rectorate of Food Fisheries and Agribusiness (DFFE) of the Danish Ministry of Agri-
culture. The objectives of the project are to: 
• measure changes in function, structure and commercial practice in the Danish food 
industry and compare and contrast these with developments in other countries;  
• characterise vertical and horizontal relationships in the Danish food chain and 
their role in delivering optimal levels of food quality, variety and safety; 
• evaluate the efficiency and competitiveness of the Danish food system at each 
stage of the marketing chain; 
• review and evaluate instruments of Danish, EU and foreign public policy  in the 
development of the food marketing chain; and  
• communicate research results in a number of media. 
1.4. Outline of report 
This report has five sections. This first section has provided background to the topic 
and motivated the study. This essentially addresses the gap between development in, 
and of, the food supply chain and the role played by government in addressing food 
industry problems through policy. The second section focuses on the food supply 
chain as an entity, and section 3 relates the described components to management and 
performance. Section 4 questions the role of government in supply chains and exam-
ines some conventional arguments for government role in markets for their applica-
tion to supply chains. Section 5 is a discussion and synthesis of the preceding sec-
tions. It returns, first, to the issue of supply chain performance, but from a social point 
of view and with the goal of focusing on a policy role in the food supply chain. Rele-
vant issues for policymakers and commercial firms, and further research topics, are 
identified.  
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2. Supply Chains 
2.1. Nomenclature and definition 
The vertical array of firms, activities, responsibilities, relationships, structures and 
functions that deliver food products and services to the consumer and beyond, is gen-
erally referred to here as the “food supply chain”. It is also variously called the food 
commodity chain, value chain and marketing chain; as well as networks, webs, arrays 
and netchains. Although some well-constructed arguments identify differentiated at-
tributes for some of these terms (e.g. Hanf and Dautzenberg, 2006; Lazzarini et al., 
2001), the current paper uses these expressions largely interchangeably. 
 
Beyond nomenclature, a variety of definitions of the supply chain are in current use. 
Most identify an enduring vertical arrangement of firms engaged in mutually-
beneficial activities that feature trust amongst firms, the pursuit of customer satisfac-
tion, and value addition. Kaplinsky and Morris (2000) define a supply chain as “the 
full range of activities required to bring a product or service from conception through 
the different phases of production, delivery to the final consumers, and disposal after 
use”. Notably, (and consistently with Stewart (1995)), the procedures of new product 
development and introduction are included in the definition. This reinforces the dy-
namic nature of the food system as proposed by Wright (1996): its effectiveness must 
be measured in terms of its capacity and ability to serve as-yet-unknown markets with 
as-yet-unknown products and services.  
 
Emphasis is often placed on three “flows” through the elements of the chain: product; 
information; and payment (Scramin and Batalha, 2003).6 Storer and Taylor (2006) 
generalise the third flow (payment) to include “management and control” which de-
lineates ownership and responsibility, and hence the allocation of risk and return in 
the chain. Wright’s view is that innovation is also a chain function: interpreted here as 
another “flow”. Boon (2001), for example, reports on four case studies of innovation 
through vertical co-ordination between two adjacent stages of selected chains. None 
of these authors have identified flows of public goods and externalities from or within 
chains to allow comparisons with markets as delivery mechanisms. 
 
Despite various attempts to define the supply chain as a focus of management and re-
search, opinion is divided as to whether the supply chain is a (new) autonomous eco-
                                                 
6 Scramin and Batalha’s (2003) paper defines the flows in a descriptive and modelling sense, then 
specifies them in a dynamic simulation model of a dairy catchment.  
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nomic entity (e.g. Gulati et al. (2000)) or simply a configuration of organisations rec-
ognizable to us as firms. Passiante and Ndou (2006) take the former view, treating the 
chain as a configuration of resources with its own capacity to generate and market 
value. These authors observe that, as with products, the long-term viability of such 
chains is dependent on their capacity to generate unique attributes that are difficult to 
imitate.  
 
The view of the supply chain as a commercially autonomous entity has not been sup-
ported by developments in accountancy. Lalonde and Pohlen’s (1996) summary of 
available accounting identities indicate that they (i) have limited capacity to track in-
dividual products, markets, customers and suppliers, (ii) remain focused on within-
firm performance and (iii) need to be implemented using standard estimates of cost 
and physical quantities. Beyond costs and revenues, Folkerts (2007) advocates the 
valuation and inclusion of supply chain relationships as assets in firms’ balance 
sheets. Gereffi (1999) and Kaplinsky and Morris (2000) characterise “buyer-driven”, 
as opposed to “producer-driven” chains, the key difference being the primacy of mar-
keting and branding in the buyer-driven chains and of a key technology in those 
driven by producers. Both chain attributes play roles both as barriers to entry and as 
attractive options for potential supply chain participants. However, no attempts have 
been made to value such chain attributes nor assign their values to key players. 
 
Taking the latter view (persistence of firms) Lazzarini et al. (2001) observe that firms 
within a network operate within one or more chains, and they mobilise this as a guide 
to resource use within a so-called “netchain”. In particular, resources that serve multi-
ple, possibly competing (see Stewart, 1995), chains are shared and therefore have 
measurable value-in-use at the margin. Economic theory suggests that optimisation 
procedures might be brought to bear on the vertical within-chain and between-firm 
allocation problem, and this approach is pursued in Baker’s (2007) mathematical pro-
gramming model of food attribute provision. Baker contrasts valuations associated 
with alternative objective functions: “whole chain” (loosely, the sum total of chain 
participants’ interests) and “single stage” (the interests of firms at just one stage). 
Baker identifies divergence (provision/non-provision) between the solutions as mar-
ket failures. Van der Vorst (2005) identifies the ”food supply chain network”, and ex-
tends Stewart’s reasoning about supply chains’ competing for resources into a discus-
sion of value addition by the chain. Van der Vorst observes that what happens be-
tween two firms depends not only on those two firms, but on what is happening be-
tween any number of other firms in any number of other relationships.  
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Public interest, as frequently portrayed in descriptions of markets, is apparently not 
represented in any definition of the supply chain. No known supply chain definitions 
attribute a role to government. 
2.2. Supply chain tasks 
Most descriptions of supply chain tasks use Stewart’s (1995) list, augmented by 
SCOR7 to include “return” or after-sales service (see figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Supply chain tasks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: adapted from Stewart (1995). 
 
PLAN SOURCE MAKE DELIVER RETURN
 
 
The product-orientation of figure 1 avoids any mention of the chain’s wider economic 
role in resource allocation or social welfare. In particular, there is no assumption that 
markets’ role in balancing supply and demand is assumed by the chain: or perhaps it 
is an extension of the “planning” task.  
2.3. Supply chain evolution and integration 
The progression of vertical chain arrangements, through increasing levels of intensity 
and scope of activities, has been chronicled by several authors. The path followed by 
recent supply chain evolution has been characterised as a shift in emphasis “from 
leanness to responsiveness and dynamism”, and “from management of capacity and 
constraints to customer satisfaction” (Hofman, 2004). For the food industry, change 
                                                 
7 Supply Chain Operations Reference Model, operated by the Supply Chain Council, an organisation 
with corporate membership.  
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has been eloquently described by Beierlein and Miller (2000) as an evolutionary 
process whereby inventory, transport, purchasing and manufacturing have been pro-
gressively merged, and decisions and activities allocated amongst collaborating firms 
across conventional boundaries. They identify the goal of supply chain management 
as “to replace inventory with information”.  
 
The primacy of information is noted by Hanf and Dautzenberg (2006), and others. 
They attribute the growth of strictly co-ordinated vertical linkages in the food supply 
chain to the increasing importance of credence attributes in the products on offer to 
consumers. Although Hennessy (1996) identifies vertical integration in agribusiness 
as a response to high costs of generating and sharing information, Kaplinsky and 
Morris (2000) observe a shift away from vertical integration toward “co-ordinated 
units, many of which are externally-owned”, or outsourcing as identified by Gun-
asekaran et al. (2001). This suggests that firms are finding new ways of dealing with 
information within the chain that are cheaper and/or generate more value, than when 
they are internalised by vertical integration. Maxwell and Slater (2003) emphasise the 
central role played by information generation and exchange in modern food policy: 
enabling so-called self-regulation and the move to outcome-driven, rather than action-
driven, regulation and compliance. It is notable that none of these authors have exam-
ined the role of intellectual property, and its associated costs or restrictions imposed 
on information flows, on chain structure, function or performance.  
 
Noting that information exchange is central to supply chain concepts and practice, 
Clark et  al. (2001) identify seven “levels of organisational interconnectivity” associ-
ated with increasingly intense within-chain exchange of information using electronic 
media. They identified limits to integration, including the sensitivity of information: 
that concerning costs, margins and impending product introductions is not shared 
within the chain. Notably, Fawcett and Magnan (2001) identify the lack of informa-
tion sharing as a key constraint on supply chain integration, but do not consider it an 
essential factor in successful integration. A further constraint identified by Clark et al. 
was the high cost of executive time required to cement relationships based on trust: 
particularly where there were high risks of defection by partners. Overall, Clark et al. 
propose a concave monotonic relationship between benefits generated and the inten-
sity of firms’ interconnectivity: the marginal benefits of initial levels are high but de-
cline with advances to successive levels.  
  
Shen (2005) portrays “arcs of integration” that measure the form (outward and inward 
vis-à-vis the firm, backward and forward in the chain) and degree of co-ordination be-
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tween firms. Although Shen found the degree of firms’ integration to be positively 
associated with their performance, the principal mechanism of benefit delivery was 
the reduction of uncertainty due to better demand and supply forecasting along the 
chain. Fawcett’s and Magnan’s (2001) survey of firms’ motivation for joining supply 
chains identified a focus on customer needs (mainly retailers) and a desire to reduce 
costs (mainly manufacturers and service suppliers). They identified “human nature” 
as the fundamental barrier to supply chain integration: specifically a lack of perceived 
need for change, and the associated organisational inertia.  
 
Schulze et al. (2006) studied the factors affecting farmers’ willingness to join a par-
ticular supply chain. Echoing the findings of earlier research into incentives related to 
farmer participation in co-operatives (Hansen et al., 2002), they found that farmers 
place a high value on impressions of inclusion and consultation. Schulze et al. meas-
ure the strength of relationships in terms of trust, satisfaction and commitment, and 
use principal components analysis to derive a single measure of “relationship qual-
ity”. Scramin and Batalha (2003) use a systems dynamics modelling approach to grid-
search a set of possible relationships between dairy farms and dairy processors. For 
each possible relationship, costs and benefits are derived from specifications of key 
performance variables defined by all members of the chain. Decisions about entry to a 
specific supply chain were successfully mimicked, and were chiefly dependent on 
both the size of the net benefits and their allocation within the supply chain. Selected 
commentary on the motivation for observed increasing supply chain integration is 
summarised in table 1. 
 
Table 1. Selected observations on supply chain evolution 
  
A
 
uthor: issue E
 
xplanation 
Gunasekaran et al. (2001):  
factors contributing to the emergence of 
supply chains 
• change within organisations; 
• increased responsiveness to changed customer re-
quirements; 
• increased emphasis on “leanness”; 
• globalisation; and 
• increased use of outsourcing.  
  
Gray and Boehlje (2006):  
firms’ objectives in employing “more 
tightly-aligned supply chains” 
• efficiency; 
• synergies from inter-firm pooling of resources; 
• responsiveness to customers; and 
•
 
 risk sharing 
 
Lohman et al. (2004):  
main reasons for firms to increase co-
operation with other firms in the chain. 
• shortening of delivery times; 
• enhancing flexibility; and  
• enabling faster introduction of new products.   
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It is notable that much of the motivation for supply chain operation, and increased in-
tensity of linkages between firms, is internal to the firm. Secondly, firms’ stated pur-
poses of supply chain integration (e.g. “efficiency”) may be met in other ways. A 
third comment is that it is not clear how “flexibility” is necessarily enhanced by tight-
ened vertical linkages to other firms.  
2.4. Supply chain management 
Supply chain management has been variously, and generally poorly, defined as the 
introduction of management principles to the integration of supply chain activities 
amongst chain stakeholders. Examples of definitions include: 
  
• “the processes from the initial raw material to the ultimate consumption of 
the finished product linking across supplier user companies” (Lummus and 
Vokurka, 1999); 
• “the integration of key business processes from end user through original 
suppliers that provides products, services, and information that add value for 
customers and other stakeholders” (Lambert et al., 1998); 
• “a network of firms interacting to deliver a product or service to the end cus-
tomers” (Ellram, 1991); and  
• “the collaborative effort of multiple channel members to design, implement, 
and manage seamless value-added processes to meet the real needs of the end 
customer. The development and integration of people and technological re-
sources as well as the coordinated management of materials, information, and 
financial flows underlie successful supply chain integration” (Fawcett and 
Magnan, 2001). 
 
Fawcett and Magnan (2001) identify a “supply chain management philosophy” which 
they refer to as “collaborative competition”, or “competing as allied teams of compa-
nies”. More generally, the purpose of supply chain management is the realisation of 
the strategic objectives of the chain (Hanf and Dautzenberg, 2006). Unlike the objec-
tives of firms, however, those of chains can be derived only from collective strategies: 
those developed jointly by the chain stakeholders (Van der Vorst, 2005), and ignoring 
social concerns. In a purely commercial context, Hanf and Dautzenberg assign the 
implementation of strategy to a chain captain, notably as two main tasks: 
 
• cooperation (resolving conflicts of interest that may cause motivational prob-
lems); and 
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• coordination (aligning the actions of firms in the absence of information about 
the nature of their interdependence). 
 
Hvolby et al. (2001) liken supply chain management to the handling of complex sys-
tems, embodied in two approaches that are often combined. The first is the reduction 
of complexity. Kaplinsky and Morris (2000) offer several examples of this: opera-
tionally, firms reduce their numbers of suppliers by using key suppliers that in turn 
source raw material from sub-suppliers (see also le Clue, 2006); and strategically, 
firms identify and pursue certain “critical success factors” or thresholds of quality or 
performance that are easily recognisable to supply chain partners. In contrast, Shen 
(2005) finds complexity to be a minor motivation for supply chain management ac-
tions. In a review of case studies of manufacturers’ supply chain management, he 
identifies 5 “paradoxes of complexity” (see table 2). 
 
Table 2. Shen’s paradoxes of complexity in supply chain management 
  
A
 
cknowledged setting O
 
bserved behaviour 
The potential gain from supply chain 
ptimisation  o
 
Most manufacturers “act locally” (i.e. optimise within their own 
oundaries) b
 
The need for consumer responsiveness  Many manufacturers are not in touch with consumers directly 
  
Product innovation continues to accel-
erate, 
Few manufacturers have prepared their supply chains for 
faster introduction of new products 
  
Flexibility is an important goal of supply 
chain operations  
Flexibility is being sacrificed in favour of reducing unit costs 
  
Quality is critical  The risks of supply chain failures in quality provision continue 
to grow   
S
 
ource: Shen (2005). 
 
 
Another means of exercising co-ordination, while generally avoiding complexity, is 
through “power”. Kaplinsky and Morris (2000) describe the exercise of power within 
the chain in two forms: ensuring consequences of actions along the chain; and ac-
tively managing and co-ordinating links in the chain. The first of these supplants tra-
ditional commercial legal instruments, such as contracts. By recognising whole-chain 
impacts of non-performance, however, externalities generated from 1-on-1 transac-
tions can be internalised – at least within the chain. It is clear, however, that the firm 
exercising the power (the chain captain) will define potential externalities in its own 
interests, and assign costs of internalisation in a self-interested manner. 
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The second of Hvolby et al.’s approaches is enhancing information processing capac-
ity, perhaps embodied in investment in hardware and software as well as communica-
tion systems. Despite Rockart et al.’s (1996) identification of Information Technolo-
gies as a driver of vertical alignment of supply chains, Shen8 found widespread disap-
pointment in IT: despite substantial investments, additional value added had not lived 
up to expectations. Shen suggests that IT requires accompanying systematic changes 
that the firms had failed to make. He does not investigate whether supply chain mem-
bership enhanced or constrained the capacity for such change. A further question is 
whether information, and its processing, can perform a useful role without advances 
in performance definition and measurement. 
 
 
                                                 
8 (2005, reporting on 25 case studies of firms in supply chains). 
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3. Supply chain performance 
3.1. Performance 
At its most basic, supply chain performance is the extent to which a set of supply 
chain arrangements satisfy or achieve objectives. Van der Vorst (2005) emphasises 
that the objectives in question must reflect the requirements of end-users and stake-
holders. He then states that performance measures are meaningful only where all 
stages of the chain aim to realise the same, jointly-defined, objective. No candidate 
objective is offered. Lohman et al. (2004) divides firms’ objectives into “operations” 
and “strategy”, from each of which a set of goals might be derived and the supply 
chain’s capacity to achieve them assessed. As noted above, a problem immediately 
emerges, in that although objectives might be clearly expressed for individual firms 
within a chain, this is rarely the case for an entire chain. Individual chains might op-
erate purely to deliver a specific outcome: but this would normally be subsidiary to 
objectives of firms within the chain. 
 
Beamon and Chen (2001) more clearly define the kinds of actions associated with 
each of operational (e.g. changing order or inventory techniques) and strategic (e.g. 
elimination of a stage in the chain, integration of information systems with a supply 
chain partner) decisions. Beamon (1999) addresses the use of strategic goals as 
benchmarks in performance measurement: this depends on how strategic goals are 
expressed within the firm and throughout the chain. Where such goals are familiar to 
employees they may feature in the set of variables being regularly measured and so be 
compatible with management that seeks to achieve these goals. On the other hand, 
strategic goals are often not clearly defined. An example given by Beamon is “im-
prove product quality”: pursuit of this goal spans product and services, is likely to in-
volve several technical tasks, and relies heavily on tight relationships in the supply 
chain.  
  
McDermott et al. (2004) examined possible divergence between chain-level and firm-
level preferences for supply chain performance measures. They surveyed beef suppli-
ers and processors to identify common or divergent requirements for supply chain 
performance measures that might be attributed to firm-level, as opposed to chain-level 
objectives. Beef producers measured supply chain performance in terms of price re-
ceived, payment security and the premia offered for quality. Their trading partners 
(beef processors) measured it as security in terms of timing of supply, traceability and 
overall costs of supply. Such a divergence is all the more notable in that it is detected 
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for just two supply chain participants, and does not address social, environmental and 
sustainability issues. 
 
Recognising such divergences, Lambert and Pohlen (2001) propose performance-
based measures associated with clearly-stated functions of the chain (table 3), namely: 
1. aligning processes across firms; 
2. targeting the most profitable market segments; and 
3. obtaining a competitive advantage through differentiated services and lower 
costs. 
 
Table 3. Motivation for supply chain metrics 
 
• The lack of measures spanning the entire supply chain 
• The requirement to take a chain-wide approach 
• The requirement to relate chain performance to corporate performance 
• The complexity of supply chain management 
• The requirement to align activities to supply chain objectives and strategy 
• To extend the “line of sight” beyond the single firm 
• Allocation of benefits and costs as conditions in the supply chain change 
• The need to differentiate the supply chain for commercial purposes 
• To encourage co-operative behaviour in the chain   
Source: Lambert and Pohlen (2001). 
 
 
 
Lambert and Pohlen note that, in the absence of good metrics, “decision-making be-
comes an exercise in power and/or politics”. Simons et al. (2003) summarise a supply 
chain management case in the British red meat industry, where the tasks of reducing 
risk and uncertainty and fostering value creation had been supplanted by “power bal-
ances within the chain” and “resulting adversarial trading relationships”. Supply chain 
tasks addressed included promotions (to reduce demand fluctuations) and production 
planning (similarly for supply). The authors describe a stakeholder consultation exer-
cise, which included problem definitions and development of key information trans-
mission mechanisms. One chain performance measure used was the proportion of 
lamb carcases achieving a specified grade. This provoked several questions from the 
researchers: first, whether carcase grades (primarily a processor creation with histori-
cal roots) actually reflect quality as perceived by the consumer. A second question 
concerned measurement: it was not clear that the chain was not producing sub-grade 
carcases; as the alternative was that such carcases were entering other supply chains 
and continued to represent lost potential income to producers that are still chain 
members. 
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3.2. Criteria for supply chain performance 
Some agreement is found in the definition of criteria for supply chain performance, at 
least as applied by single firms. SCOR identifies five main criteria, and these have 
been widely adopted in the literature: 
• delivery reliability; 
• responsiveness; 
• flexibility; 
• cost; and 
• asset management efficiency. 
 
Beamon (1998) simplifies this list to include “resources” (including financial), “out-
put” and “flexibility”, and devotes considerable effort to define and quantify flexibil-
ity. Caplice and Sheffi (1995) favour performance criteria that are transaction-based 
(i.e. dealing with variable, rather than fixed, costs), and that are focused on the down-
stream stages (i.e. those that address the customer’s needs). Although much emphasis 
is placed on vertical relationships, these authors identify the danger of neglecting 
“horizontal” issues: if criteria are insufficiently targeted at variables at an individual 
stage of the chain, then problems may simply be shifted around between stages, rather 
than solved.  
 
Such sets of diverse criteria reflect the multi-dimensional nature of supply chain per-
formance. Even if chain objectives can be stated and the chains’ satisfaction of them 
measured, a single numeraire has not been established to rationalise performance 
measures. The existence of both qualitative and quantitative performance indicators is 
widely acknowledged, but few ideas have emerged about how to utilise them in a sys-
tematic way. Several authors have proposed balanced scorecards (e.g. Van der Vorst, 
2005), but have not enlarged on how they might be designed or managed. Lohman et 
al. (2004) report on a case study of a supply chain for sports shoes, which used a bal-
anced scorecard. These authors’ focus was on the process of developing performance 
measures that stakeholders will use, rather than the measures themselves. They advo-
cate, for example, that the development process should ideally entail co-ordination of 
existing activities rather than design (or radical introduction) of new ones. Perform-
ance measures were assessed as % satisfaction of desirable levels (or trajectories) of 
variables defined into six clusters (customer service, financial performance, product 
flow, process improvement, employee satisfaction and environmental sustainability). 
A variety of weightings could be entered into a user interface resembling a car’s 
dashboard and control console.  
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Bailey and Norina (2005) adopt an alternative approach, also based on normalised 
measures of the satisfaction of supply chain stakeholders. In particular, expectations 
fully met by grain mills and traders are assigned 1 on an interval [0,1]. Other, identi-
cal, scales are used to reflect different dimensions of satisfaction. An overall satisfac-
tion level is derived by assigning weights to the scales. Those metrics allow four in-
sights to the performance of the chain. First, poorly-performing stages of the chain 
could be identified, with a focus on supply chain financial and material flows. Sec-
ond, the timing of sequential performance could be identified (season-by-season, in 
the case of grain) and improvement or deterioration identified. Thirdly, interactions 
between supply chain problems with payment and with delivery could be identified to 
explain volumetric fluctuations in the chain over time, and the impact these have on 
stakeholder satisfaction. Lastly, different chains can be compared. 
3.3. Performance of, and performance in, the supply chain 
It is widely acknowledged that supply chain management lacks unambiguous meas-
ures of chain performance. Lee and Billington (1992) and Aramyan et al. (2005) both 
observe that the “chain information” that firms employ within supply chains is pri-
marily internal to the firm or at best features just those firms immediately proximate 
in the supply chain. Firms have then focused on their “performance in a supply 
chain”, rather than “the performance of the supply chain”. In their study of the Dutch 
tomato chain, Aramyan et al. defined performance measures (largely following across 
Beamon) across 4 categories: efficiency; flexibility; responsiveness; and quality (sub-
divided into product and process quality) which firms then rated for importance and 
reported whether or not they measured them. The result was that firms rated as impor-
tant and/or measured only those variables that affected firm performance, not chain 
performance. 
 
In Taylor and Simons’ (2004) study of the UK pork supply chain, customer value at 
several points in the chain was identified (price, quality and taste, availability, waste, 
safety) by survey, and “key performance indicators” were adapted from available 
numbers (no new variables or metrics were developed). Five different supply chains 
were then evaluated. The evaluation was not for an overall score for each chain, but 
for the extent to which specific initiatives by/within each chain were able to contrib-
ute to improvements in the key performance indicators. Thus, the result ranked chains 
for their effectiveness in making changes, with results reflecting chain performance.  
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Van der Vorst (2000) examine a Dutch supply chain delivering chilled salads. Eight 
performance measures were used: 3 cost-based (inventory, processing and logistics, 
and wastes/price reductions) and 5 service-based (product range, number of stock-
outs, utilisation of transport, freshness and delivery reliability). These span most of 
Aramyan’s categories. Van der Vorst found that three management changes in the 
chain improved chain performance as measured: increased ordering and delivery fre-
quency; reduced producers’ lead times and introduction of new IT systems. As with 
Baker’s (2007) model, that research was highly focused on financial performance 
within the chain, and does not address the social values that might be placed on prod-
ucts and processes, and used as metrics. 
 
Jackson et al. (2006) motivate discussion of the performance of the food supply chain 
by identifying two key emotive issues in peoples’ perceptions of food, namely its 
provenance and its authenticity. These authors present several policy and marketing 
initiatives that promote locally-produced food, and food products that are produced 
using methods that are perceived as environmentally and socially9 sustainable. A per-
formance metric they describe is “Food Miles”, which is essentially a measure of fos-
sil fuel used in the production, processing, delivery, purchasing (including consumers 
driving to and from shops) and disposal of food products. The energy used in produc-
tion and disposal of inputs and packaging is also considered. Controversy over “Food 
Miles” has focused more on its unexpected indications than on its validity as an in-
dictor of resource use: notably that chains using imports from low-input exporting 
countries can accumulate fewer food miles than high-input local producers (Saunders 
et al., 2006).  
 
Following the theme of specified impacts, Life Cycle Analysis (LCA)10 maintains 
multi-dimensional performance measures (e.g. human health, environmental quality) 
that can be related to various parameters11 (per area of land, volume of water, weight 
of product, unit of energy). From a policy perspective this allows rankings of chains 
across a range of potential stakeholder concerns. However, LCA has primarily been 
targeted at agricultural production systems in their entirety, rather than the whole 
chain or indeed individual chains (Foster et al., 2006). Similarly, certification based 
on minimum levels of environmentally-related activities have been employed in de-
signing “Good Agricultural Practice” regimes (GAPs). 
 
                                                 
9 In the sense of maintaining or nurturing the rural communities in which the production occurs. 
10 Thanks are due to Jørgen Dejgård Jensen for this insight during a review of the paper. 
11 Haas et al. (2000) refer to these as “functional units”. 
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Foster et al. (2006) carried out LCA on food supply chains in Britain, notably ad-
dressing “trolleys” (actual consumption bundles) and measuring their life cycle envi-
ronmental impacts on energy use and associated global warming indicators, land use, 
water and eutrophication, and selected pollution measures. Their results include some 
reversals of conventional wisdom, such as identifying some environmental challenges 
associated more with organic, than with conventional, production systems; and identi-
fying car-based shopping as a greater environmental impact than transport within the 
chain. They observe that many of their results are sensitive to assumptions, particu-
larly about waste levels and methods of its disposal or recycling. The authors identify 
many missing elements for such an application of LCA, notably primary data with 
which to compare individual supply chains. 
3.4. Issues of metrics 
Beamon (1999) identifies four key questions associated with a performance meas-
urement system:  
1. what to measure; 
2. how to integrate multiple measures into a system; 
3. how often to measure; 
4. how to make changes to the measurement system. 
 
Caplice and Sheffi (1994) list eight criteria for metrics in supply chain management 
and performance measurement (see table 4). Essentially these reflect compatibility 
with management and technical tasks going on within single firms, and they probably 
apply less well to the chain as a whole than to firms. The final four criteria are of par-
ticular interest. The benefit/cost ratio of data collection and use (“economy” in table 
3.1) and compatibility with existing data systems echo Lohman et al. (2004) in that 
changes to bring about chain performance measurement must be evolutionary rather 
than revolutionary. Addressing Beamon’s fourth question, the requirement for “be-
havioural soundness” is obviously easier to achieve within a firm than along an entire 
chain: indeed its application requires a positive-sum return on chain integration.  
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Table 4. Criteria for metrics 
  
C
 
riterion E
 
xplanation 
V
 
alidity T
 
he metric accurately represents what is being measured 
Robustness The metric is comparable across users, time and location. 
The metric is repeatable  
  
Usefulness The metric is understood by the decision-maker and is capable of guiding 
actions 
  
Integration The metric includes all relevant aspects of a process of interest 
  
E
 
conomy B
 
enefits of using the metric exceed the costs of collecting and processing it 
Compatibility The metric is compatible with existing information systems 
  
L
 
evel of detail T
 
he level of aggregation is sufficient for the user  
Behavioural soundness The incentives for strategic responses by agents is minimised    
S
 
ource: Caplice and Sheffi (1994). 
 
 
In contrast, Gunasekaran et al. (2001) elaborate supply chain performance metrics 
over 6 key performance topics, with much more attention to relationships across con-
ventional boundaries of the firm (see table 5). They address many of the practical is-
sues associated with Hofman’s hierarchy, particularly supply and demand forecasting 
throughout the chain. In addition, “supply chain partnerships” are targeted, recognis-
ing that the relationships between firms are key to the successful operation of the 
chain. Gunasekaran et al. elaborate on measurement of “extent or depth of partner-
ship”: first, measuring the extent to which chain partners are involved in problem 
solving or examination of alternatives; and second, using that measure as a perform-
ance metric. Measures of “relationship quality” differ from those used by Schulze et 
al. (2006), but represent two different approaches to the same problem. Although the 
final topic addresses inventory (as an asset), “delivery links” also contain elements 
relevant to inventory in terms of how it is handled across firm boundaries. Notably 
inventory “scrapped”, “obsolete” and “re-worked” receives consideration as recom-
mended by Beamon. 
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Table 5. Selected supply chain performance metrics 
  
T
 
opic M
 
etric 
Planned orders  Order lead times 
 Path of order traverse 
  
Supply chain partnerships Checklist on performance of partners 
 
 
E
 
xtent or depth of partnership 
Production level Cost, physical productivity 
 Range of products and services 
 Capacity utilisation 
 Effectiveness of scheduling 
 Human resource productivity 
 Inventory levels 
  
Delivery links Delivery-to-request date 
 Delivery-to-commit date 
 Order fill lead time 
 % of goods in transit 
 % of “faultless notes” 
 
 
T
 
otal distribution costs 
Customer satisfaction and 
service 
Time between customer query and information delivery 
Level of after-sales service relative to customer expectations 
 Availability of spares 
  
Supply chain finance and 
logistics 
Return on Assets and Return on Investment associated with the supply 
chain 
of which, inventory costs: opportunity cost of warehousing, storage and tied-up capital and  
 costs of work-in-progress 
 management and insurance of stock 
 goods in transit 
 steps taken against risk of threat, damage, spoilage 
 worked scrapped, re-worked or obsolete 
 lost sales due to inadequate inventory   
S
 
ource: Gunasekaran et al. (2001). 
 
 
Beamon and Chen (2001) discuss the use of single performance measures, which 
have the advantage of simplicity. Given the difficulties in combining measures, single 
measures may well ignore others of equal value but which contain other information. 
Where a single measure involves costs, these authors emphasise the importance of 
addressing inventory correctly. Beamon and Chen’s chief concern is that inventory 
features obsolescence and degradation (particularly in the food industry), which are 
difficult to account for in single measures (Foster et al., (2006) make the same claim 
for multiple measures). From the point of view of the whole chain, Lambert and Poh-
len (2001) further point out that inventory steadily increases in value as it moves 
through the supply chain, so technical improvements (such as increasing inventory 
turnover) have different values when brought about by different members of the 
chain. Particularly in the agri-food sector, costs of accumulating and managing inven-
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tory also vary up and down the chain. Periera and Csillag (2004) note that Brazilian 
chicken meat supply chains achieved substantial improvements in handling of inven-
tory, which was born out in increased profits to chain participants and could be meas-
ured in chain-relevant metrics. However, much of the improvement appears to have 
been due to vertical integration rather than co-ordination within an integrated chain. 
 
Banamyong (2005) uses inventory-related performance metrics to examine the inter-
national supply chain that imports shrimp into the United States. She uses the length 
of the cash-to-cash cycle,12 and identifies extreme divergence in supply chain per-
formance, depending on which stage is being studied. Importers have a negative cash-
to-cash measure (i.e. they sell the shrimp before paying for them), while retailers, pro-
ducers and traders have quite different (but positive) values. A notable feature of that 
research is that chain participants’ satisfaction with the chain is not measured.  
  
Hofman (2004) proposes a 3-tier hierarchy of supply chain performance metrics. The 
primacy she affords demand forecasting is supported by numerous authors in the pur-
suit of reducing uncertainty. Beamon and Chen (2001) provide the best description of 
how differing levels of variance in volumes up and down the chain (Lee et al.’s 
“bullwhip effect”) can arise from poor demand and supply forecasting. A notable fea-
ture of Hofman’s (figure 2) hierarchy is that inventory-related metrics appear in tier 2. 
 
Figure 2. A hierarchy of supply chain metrics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Demand 
forecast 
accuracy
Perfect order 
in deliveries
SC management 
costs
Accounts payable Inventory total Accounts receivable
Cost items Cost volatility Utilisation of 
plant
Delivery 
details
1st tier
2nd tier
3rd tier
 
                                                 
12 Accounts receivable minus inventory turnover minus accounts payable. 
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4. Government in the supply chain 
4.1. Government’s position relative to the food supply chain 
The position, role and stake of government in the modern agri-food supply chain have 
not previously been identified. Government may be one or more of: 
• a member of the supply chain; 
• a provider of infrastructure; 
• a provider of services; and/or 
• a policeman. 
 
Where government acts as a guardian of the public interest (de Gorter and Swinnen, 
1994) it might be viewed as “exogenous to the food system” (Henson et al., 1995). 
Another interpretation is that the government is a contributor to the social production 
of the food chain: essential to society’s supply of public (or other) goods subject to 
various forms of market failure. In delivery of services outside the spectrum of the 
food industry, government becomes a member of the food supply chain in cases of 
state agencies’ market participation (e.g. food provision in hospitals, schools and 
prisons). In government action within the food supply chain, it is unclear whether 
government can or should operate as a chain captain. Government that remains exter-
nal to the supply chain might be perceived as the appropriate standpoint for work in 
compliance monitoring and enforcement (loosely described as “policing” above). 
 
Governments may be the providers of infrastructure for the food supply chain: both 
“hard” (e.g. roading and  communications networks) and “soft” (e.g. the legal frame-
work for enforcement of contracts). In seeking to explain international trade flows, 
Hausman et al. (2005) noted the significant international differences in the quality 
and costs of logistics services, including port transit, transport and inspections. They 
attributed trade flows to cost amalgams made of delay times, reliability of service, 
complexity of procedures, and risks. The result is in agreement with Hummels (2001) 
who used an index of time delays and found trade flows to be related to countries’ 
transaction procedures, measured as an index of “institutional quality”. Hausman also 
uses a “logistics index”, similar to Pyke’s (2005) use of “total landed cost” as a com-
pound measure of logistics and services.  
 
Government provision of services might be motivated by arguments about under-
provision due to market failure (Henson et al., 1995), but might also be associated 
with society’s trust of government, rather than firms within the supply chain, to pro-
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vide services such as accurate product information to consumers (Hobbs, 2003) or 
market information to market participants (Hayami and Petersen, 1972). Markets’ role 
as information providers (specifically on prices, volumes and price-quality linkages) 
enables government monitoring of markets for regulatory purposes, when acting as a 
“policeman” as above. The extent to which government can monitor these variables 
where they are internalised within chains is not clear.  
4.2. A “government” food supply chain 
Another view of government is as a parallel supply chain. Two highly-visible exam-
ples of government ownership and management of a food supply chain are emergency 
relief and military support operations. Davidson (2006) offers a review of supply 
chain management in emergency relief. She identifies three major differences be-
tween this context and the private sector. First, that the private sector’s supply chains 
exist before the customer is served, while relief operations are created and dismantled 
ad hoc. Second, while every disaster is different, firms stay largely the same and tend 
to address similar sets of customers. Third, private supply chain operations are con-
tinuous, and feature feedbacks that enable the use of contemporaneously-collected in-
formation. Conversely, disasters are episodic and information from one event tends to 
be used in the next, rather than the current, relief operation. Davidson lists features of 
humanitarian organisations and their activities that create difficulties in performance 
measurement (Table 6). These problem areas are notable for their similarity to those 
applying in the private sector.  
 
Table 6. Factors limiting performance definition and measurement in humanitar-
ian organisations 
 
• Lack of centrally-captured data 
• Limited IT infrastructure 
• Lack of funding for IT infrastructure 
• Variable/chaotic environment surrounding disaster events 
• External factors (often specific to localities) 
• Lack of incentives for measurement due to organisations’ being not-for-profit 
• Potential for negative media exposure/interpretation of results  
• Human resource issues 
• Inappropriate organisational culture 
• Conflicts between short and long term goals of a disaster response.   
S
 
ource: Davidson (2006). 
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4.3. Social responsibility in the food supply chain 
Several authors have identified firms’ pursuit of “the triple bottom line” (Profit, Peo-
ple, Planet) as evidence of their commitment to society and environment in addition 
to shareholder returns. Van der Vorst (2005) observes “value now includes the triple 
P”, and proposes that supply chains are effective vehicles for delivering it. Pierick et 
al. (2004) outline principles of corporate social responsibility, as well as processes 
that firms use to implement it.13  ASrIA. (2006) provides an overview of initiatives 
taken in selected supply chains in Asia, but does not outline a role for government. 
 
Cramer (2005) reports on a survey of multinational firms that sought to impose corpo-
rate social responsibility throughout their supply chains. Firms reported that the first 
step in doing so was identifying the supply chain, and that this was easier for firms 
serving niche markets than “mainstream” markets. Subsequent steps involved formu-
lating and imposing standards on suppliers, which was again easier in differentiated 
markets. Cramer also concluded that agri-food supply chains are easier to identify and 
standardise than industry-based ones, due to ease of tracing back to the raw mate-
rial.14  Third party certification services play a significant role in Cramer’s sample of 
firms, particularly in differentiated product delivery. However, the causality is not 
clear, in that differentiation may indeed be enabled by certification, rather than invit-
ing it as an improvement in supply chain management. 
 
Le Clue (2006) reports on risks of poor social and environmental conduct in supply 
chains by Asian firms. The main risks are identified as labour and environmental 
practices, the latter involving the exploitation of displaced farmers as a consequence 
of changing land use. Like Cramer, Le Clue discovered widespread use of certifica-
tion services, and notably identified a government programme in China that offered 
financial rewards to those reporting breaches of labour laws.  
4.4. Market failure 
Conventionally, market failure addresses a market outcome in comparison with a pro-
jected socially-efficient outcome. The advent of the food supply chain introduces a 
third outcome. No theoretical construction provides guidance as to whether the supply 
chain outcome is necessarily a greater, or a reduced, divergence from the socially ef-
                                                 
13 e.g. environmental assessment; stakeholder management and consultation; and issues manage-
ment. 
14 This statement might be debated by food industry commentators. 
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ficient outcome. Moreover, measures of supply chain performance are currently not 
targeted at social performance, so provide little guidance to policy makers. Several 
authors have identified market failures with the vertical array of firms involved in the 
supply chain. These address transactions costs, public goods and externalities. 
 
Transactions costs that are high, or asymmetric between adjacent firms, have been 
identified as one such market failure (Hobbs, 1996), affecting both the firms’ traded 
volumes and the willingness to trade in/enter the supply chain. Producer organisations 
have been widely proposed as a means of reducing transactions costs, perhaps in pur-
suit of symmetry in scale-related costs and bargaining power between chain stages 
(Pingali et al., 2005), but such analysis has not been applied to transaction costs be-
tween stages. 
 
The presence of public goods within the chain has been addressed in terms of generic 
promotions (Crespi, 2003) whereby all members benefit from such promotions but no 
single firm or coalition of firms at a stage has the incentive to provide such promo-
tions. Where there exists a demand for product information, the market failure argu-
ment is usually mobilised to justify government involvement in provision and admini-
stration of food standards (Gardner, 2003). For standards, and other product differen-
tiation mechanisms, administration of certification systems by a third party may in-
volve government particularly in multi-purpose programmes or those targeted at con-
sumers’ peace of mind, such as traceability (e.g. British Food Standards Authority, 
2002). However, government action in information provision and certification may be 
preferred by consumers due to mistrust of the vested interest of private firms (Hobbs, 
2003), or consumers’ unwillingness to pay for it (Latvala and Kola, 2000). 
 
Clearly, many of these market failures might be corrected by vertical co-ordination, as 
in the case of co-ordination between farmers and powerful retailers being shown to 
reduce transactions costs for the small farmer and encourage entry into the chain 
(Reardon and Berdegué, 2002; Reardon and Swinnen, 2004). Strongly integrated sup-
ply chains would, at least in theory, internalise issues associated with promotions, in-
formation management and transactions costs. However, they may exacerbate non-
market impacts on stakeholders outside the integrated chain, as described above re-
garding the environment, rural communities and broader issues of sustainability.  
 
So-called “vertical externalities” also extend to imperfect competition, particularly the 
issues of double marginalisation that arise where two or more imperfectly competitive 
markets are adjacent with the chain. Vettas (2006) first concludes that, under several 
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conditions, double marginalisation drives the market outcome even further from the 
perfectly competitive outcome than does a singe monopoly or monopsony stage. Sec-
ond, he demonstrates that vertical integration offsets these effects, even if it involves 
reversion to a single monopoly or monopsony outcome. The extent to which double 
marginalisation may be offset by vertical co-ordination or other chain integration 
steps is unknown. In particular, the impact of chain captaincy on monopoly-type out-
comes has not been examined. 
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5. Discussion and conclusions 
5.1. Social performance of the food supply chain 
The modern food supply chain is poorly defined, beyond its essential functions of 
product delivery and essential vertically co-ordinated form. It is not clear whether the 
chain is a collection of firms or is actually a new economic entity: value addition and 
asset ownership accrues to chain members, but decision-making within chains can be 
assigned to one agent. Balancing of supply and demand is a key function of markets 
and of supply chains, but takes very different forms in each. Competition between 
supply chains has not been compared with that between firms for its impact on cost 
minimisation and subsequent long run industrial adjustments. Nonetheless, supply 
chains are assuming the roles played by markets in resource allocation in the farming 
and food system. Their tasks have been described in terms of activities (“plan, source, 
make, deliver, return”), and extended on to embrace innovation. Supply chains’ social 
roles have not been identified. The definition and measurement of performance, and 
the policies and policy processes within which such performance might be optimised, 
have not been addressed.  
 
Much commentary on supply chains and their management focuses on information. 
Although provision of information within the chain is promoted in pursuit of some 
chain outcomes (e.g. delivery of credence attributes), it is also seen by some as a con-
straint on chain integration. In particular, commercial secrecy prevails, which indi-
cates that the much-vaunted “trust” element across the inter-firm boundaries in the 
supply chain is a scarce resource. Moreover, intellectual property held by stake-
holders within chains is likely to affect information exchange. Prevailing food indus-
try policy relies heavily on the transparency of markets, particularly their generation 
of observable prices, patterns of firm-level profit and investment, and clear bounda-
ries of ownership of products and assets. The ongoing integration of the food supply 
chain erodes this policy-enabling database and the associated set of performance 
measures.  
 
Just as markets ignore many non-traded items, so does the supply chain in terms of 
the environment and sustainability, community preservation and development, and 
other social tasks that society assigns to agriculture and the food industry. Little con-
sideration has been given to whether these market failures are the same as, or differ-
ent from, those generated by markets. Policies that seek to correct market failures, 
particularly by distorting markets so as to mimic socially efficient outcomes, may 
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have rather different effects when applied to chains. Exclusive dealing arrangements 
provide one example: policies designed to prevent monopoly/monopsony outcomes 
may undermine the tightly-integrated trading arrangements required in chains. Gov-
ernment inspection services in the meat sector provide another: advanced meat supply 
chains feature elaborate performance measures and intensive auditing at many points 
in the chain; duplication of these by government is unlikely to improve food safety 
performance but will add the costs of duplication to processing firms, who will then 
pass the costs on as reduced benefits throughout the chain. 
 
One taxonomy of market failures within chains provides for problems of (i) co-
ordination and (ii) co-operation (Hanf and Dautzenburg, 2006). A strong argument 
may be made that chain mechanisms provide better means of managing these two 
problems than are available from conventional markets or from vertical integration. 
However, a social perspective is that co-ordination and co-operation extend only to 
selected stakeholders, and not to society at large. Because these tasks tend to be as-
sumed by “chain captains”, rather than any quorum of chain stakeholders, there seems 
little reason to believe that co-ordination and co-operation mechanisms are automati-
cally socially optimal. Indeed, a study of “fairness” of chain transaction arrangements 
uncovered widespread dissatisfaction amongst chain participants (Duffy et al., 2003). 
Weighting of social chain performance measures would then be appropriate to reflect 
participants’ interests, because policy is necessarily concerned with fairness.  
 
Although chains are inclusive by design, their defining features are exclusivity in the 
pursuit of product differentiation and exclusion of non-performing participants and 
products. Substantial research attention is being paid to the plight of food industry 
participants (particularly small farmers) that are excluded from supply chains, but lit-
tle effort has been applied to flows, particularly of product, that are excluded due to 
quality, scheduling or other problems. In the case presented by Simons et al. (2003), 
excellence in compliance to quality standards may have masked the fact that sub-
standard product was flowing to other markets or along other chains. Although supply 
chains embrace the task of “return” (see above), waste product and used packaging 
may well exit the chain in question and impose negative externalities elsewhere. To 
measure the true performance of the chain, a holistic and inclusive approach is there-
fore needed. Notably, aggregate market indicators (averages of grades or prices 
achieved) will mask divergences between the chain and the residual product flows.  
 
Just as some flows are unaccounted for, so are some stocks. Despite well-described 
and explained patterns (or arcs) of increasing integration and the emergence of chain-
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dominated commerce, assets remain in the ownership of firms. Assets that primarily 
belong to chains, particularly flows and stocks of information, remain without value 
and so potentially subject to underprovision. Several researchers have pointed out the 
net-chain nature of modern food system, and the multiplicity of uses that assets at one 
point in the chain may have. This feature has been used in valuation of assets, but 
values have been shown to diverge between their value to the firm on one hand, and 
to the chain on the other (Baker, 2007). Moreover, firms may belong to more than one 
chain, each to serve a specific purpose, so that firms’ assets are not attributable to sin-
gle chains. Aside from social considerations, accounting valuation methods for chain 
assets have not yet emerged. 
 
A major focus of supply chain management “resource” and “asset” issues is inven-
tory. Inventory clearly increases in value as it proceeds along the supply chain, so lo-
gistics-related manipulation of inventory levels yields a different return at each point 
in the chain. The likely outcome is that inventory accumulates at the earliest possible 
point in the chain: food industry examples might include live animals left on farms 
and crops left standing or in farm storage. The continued presence of the products on 
the farms is likely to generate costs that are not compensated for in the chain: lost pas-
ture production and/or reduced animal productivity; loss of alternative sales or storage 
opportunities; added risks at the farm level; and the cost of capital tied up in unsold 
production. A second effect is that spoilage and obsolescence (represented in live-
stock or weight and conditions divergence from targets) is poorly measured and com-
pensated for in the chain. A third effect is the likely environmental externalities of 
degradation of soil, pasture, water, air and landscape. Lastly, the lowered value of in-
ventory at farm level reduces incentives within the chain to provide information and 
preserve quality, which together are significant drivers of supply chain development. 
 
Against this background of difficulties in agent identification, valuation and data gen-
eration, a large number of researchers have proposed supply chain performance 
measures for the private sector. These are primarily based on product and material de-
livery, system flexibility, and the return to particular resources. The overwhelming 
majority of such measures have targeted firms’ performance in a chain setting, rather 
than the performance of the chain itself. A further problem is the multiplicity of pos-
sible variables of interest and the intractability of their synthesis into useable single 
metrics. There is agreement that satisfaction of agents’ objectives is a strong basis for 
performance measures, and in this setting promising options are (i) balanced score-
cards and (ii) indexing of objectives’ satisfaction [0,1] intervals with aggregation pos-
sible by assigning weights to variables. However, few metrics have been developed 
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that would indicate social performance of the food supply chain. “Food Miles”, “car-
bon footprints” and Life Cycle Analyses can embrace the entire chain and measure 
chain performance, but are essentially one-dimensional (associated with fossil fuel 
use). Such measures ignore value generated (and hence efficiency of use of the fossil 
fuels) and are difficult to combine with other performance indicators. More funda-
mentally, and as observed by Caplice and Sheffi (1994) these measures are not re-
flected in any chain participant’s objective set. The self-evidence of incentive-
incompatibility is that governments, and not supply chains, pay for such analyses. The 
adoption by chains of GAP certification systems, and corporate responsibility pro-
grammes, may be a guide to suitable criteria for measures used internally.  
 
To abstract from conflicting objectives, Davidson (2006) presents a case where objec-
tives are simple to identify, and in which government assumes all or most supply 
chain functions and management: disaster relief operations. She points out that many 
of the difficulties of supply chain management, particularly the identification and use 
of metrics, are the same for government as for private firms. These entail the lack of 
appropriate performance criteria, lack of communication between parts of the chain, 
incentive-incompatibility in handling information, and poor metric definition and 
combination. A relevant fundamental metric would be “lives saved”, but this is rarely 
useful in comparing emergencies and does not address efficiency: more generally 
there is no counterfactual or base case upon which to base such metrics. She identifies 
candidates for performance measurement including delays in aid delivery and propor-
tion of pledged aid delivered by donors. These capture the interests of the most vul-
nerable chain members and address payments by its most advantaged, respectively, 
but there is little scope for their combination. As in the private supply chain, David-
son emphasises flexibility and responsiveness as performance measures. 
 
Chain flexibility and responsiveness (addressed in several papers by Beamon) targets 
magnitude of variance at several points in the chain. Social interest in this perform-
ance measure spans many issues. First, payment delays following delivery are key in-
dicators of equity and efficiency problems. Second, socially important roles of the 
food supply chain such as animal disease control, responses to food contamination, 
and delivery to disaster-affected areas require these chain attributes. Beamon’s meas-
ures centre on capacity of a firm or chain to deliver while remaining profitable. A so-
cial orientation would require the specification of government roles and funding 
streams or services to support the firms in the chain. 
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Supply chain management has been usefully divided into “strategic” and “opera-
tional” tasks, with performance measures revealed as indicators of the extent to which 
objectives are met. Within the chain, strategies are difficult to discern and usually dif-
fer between agents on the chain. Establishment of government policy goals, strategies 
and implementation means are generally subject to rather more scrutiny, and are bet-
ter publicised, than is the case for private firms. Because the “commodity chain con-
cept” is well established in society’s expectations of the food industry and delivery 
system (Jackson et al., 2006), the food supply chain is an appropriate focus for per-
formance measures related to strategic policy objectives. Operational objectives for 
policy refer more to government actions in implementation: actions taken by govern-
ment rather than by the chain. 
5.2. Policy issues and responses 
Focus of policy on the food supply chain requires definition of government’s rele-
vance to specific supply chains and to the food industry in general. This will deter-
mine its objectives for the supply chain. As stated above, strategic objectives would 
be pursued rather than operational ones. Strategic objectives might target efficiency, 
equity, and the long term development of both. 
 
Efficiency-targeting objectives for the food supply chain would, as is the case for a 
market-oriented food system, refer to allocative efficiency of resources based on eco-
nomic values and sustainability. Chain activities that capture and promote protection 
or sustainable use of non-traded resources might be exempted any government inter-
vention. Examples include chains involved in extracting resources (e.g. harvesting of 
forest products), production and marketing of low-fossil-fuel-intensive production, 
and production methods with low impact on soil, water and air quality (e.g. pasture-
fed livestock). Government roles would extend to monitoring and periodic audits, 
with certification and regular audits assigned to the chain or to third parties. The chain 
would fund such activities only if profitable by means of resource-related price pre-
mia. Access to that premium would then be rationed by access to the resource, creat-
ing a further policy problem: monopoly power. Rights of access, allocated by trans-
ferable quotas, offer one option. Such a system effectively operates in the EU as 
schemes for protected designation of origin (PDO), protected geographical indication 
(PGI) and traditional speciality guaranteed (TSG). Rationing of sustainable access to 
the resource is managed within each scheme. The schemes, however, contain many 
supply chains, so such a policy system would not refer necessarily to chains. Where 
PDO-type schemes were not appropriate (e.g. chains marketing low-input produc-
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tion), trademark protection offers barriers to entry that are low enough to maintain 
competitive pressure on prices. 
 
Power relationships in the supply chain have not yet been compared with imperfectly 
competitive conduct in markets in terms of distortion of socially-optimal outcomes 
and accumulation of excess profits by individual agents. Whereas efficient markets 
might be associated with many disparate and autonomous decision-makers in firms, 
efficient chains are frequently described in terms of chain captaincy and tasks such as 
co-ordination and co-operation that they perform.   
  
Equity-targeting objectives would have a twin focus: first, on fairness within the 
chain; and second on the welfare and sustainability of sensitive communities. As 
pointed out above, fairness within the chain could not be addressed by monitoring of 
costs and prices because exchange between firms is subsumed into chain operation. 
Furthermore, most chain members face additional costs associated with value addition 
and product differentiation, so that available average market prices are poor indicators 
of profits at a given stage in the chain. True measures of fairness within the chain 
would target value added, and the shares accruing to each chain stage relative to (i) 
costs incurred; (ii) value generated; and (iii) risks endured. Alternatives to direct po-
licing of margins include chain certification of fairness and transparency akin to that 
employed in first-to-third world trade schemes such as Fair Trade.15  In the presence 
of third-party certification of chains, the government role would revert to periodic au-
dit. 
 
The policy response regarding rural communities is difficult to project. Such commu-
nities’ exclusion from integrated supply chains can, in theory, be countered by local 
marketing initiatives such as farmers’ markets, “community agriculture” schemes or 
other short-chain options as outlined above by Lucas and Jones. Whether such options 
require or justify specific government interventions is debatable, but numerous re-
gional/rural development instruments do so.16  Direct promotion of links to modern 
food supply chains has received much less policy attention, although these instru-
ments target value-adding activities and marketing. 
 
Ethical issues already receive substantial attention from interest groups and policy 
agencies. Animal welfare, for example, is subject to substantial regulation throughout 
                                                 
15 See Hayes (2006). 
16 See Baker et al. (2007) for a discussion in the Danish context. 
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the chain. Rather than government policing (at each ownership change) of housing, 
veterinary care, transport, pre-slaughter and slaughter actions, a chain certification 
mechanism appears preferable. As another ethical issue, GMO certification is already 
common in many supply chains but operates alongside a government inspection 
scheme in the EU. As new ethical issues arise in the future, a certification approach 
allows a gradual introduction of control that might be varied in form, completeness 
and impact as facts emerge and/or social attitudes change.  
 
Regulation that requires firms’ compliance with high levels of investment, or high re-
current costs, has been seen as a contributing factor to food convergence. This is due 
to the perception that large and/or diverse firms can better afford such compliance 
costs than can small firms.17  Certification as a compliance measure offers the oppor-
tunity for chains, rather than firms, to negotiate with service providers. This involves 
firms of, potentially, all sizes and the payment form and mechanism may then suit the 
specific chain and product.  
5.3. Commercial issues 
Of primary concern to firms in supply chains, and particularly to chain captains, is the 
identification of social tasks required of the chain. New policy initiatives to influence 
chain outcomes will inevitably add costs to existing chain operations, but the more 
profound impact of a chain-oriented policy will be the dynamic effect of such policies 
on the future design and operation of chains. 
 
Chain assets (and liabilities) currently remain within the balance sheets of chain 
members, rather than being owned by autonomous “chain” entities. This distorts in-
vestment incentives within the chain, due to the accumulation of risk with those own-
ing the assets. Where policies target specific chain activities, they will inevitably ad-
dress the owners of assets rather than members of a chain. This provides a destabilis-
ing influence on chains, as members may exit a chain that appears susceptible to pol-
icy-related costs, leaving the asset-owning chain member to face not only the policy-
related costs, but also those associated with sub-optimal product volume and uncer-
tainty in chain members’ commitment. 
 
Partnership with government in chain-related policy implementation will require sub-
stantial information sharing. In addition to reluctance on the part of firms to incur the 
                                                 
17 See Hamann and Baker (2004).  
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costs of generating such information, firms are unlikely to want to share potentially 
sensitive information with government. Indications of this are that information shar-
ing within a chain is problematic, let alone with parties (such as government) beyond 
the chain. For this reason, Lohman et al. (2004) advocates that supply chain manage-
ment systems must be adaptations of existing systems, rather than radical new sets of 
activities. Those authors particularly refer to the desirability of using existing infor-
mation systems, rather than developing new ones. Issues of trust obviate the need to 
bound the government chain information requirement within that of the chain: no firm 
should be asked to provide chain information to government that has not already been 
shared with chain members. 
 
The government as a chain participant, or as a provider of special services to chains, 
offers benefits to chains that are not available to firms operating in markets. Taking 
the example of the latter in the form of government-funded research and training pro-
grammes, serving a set of chains allows research and training to be much more fo-
cused on value addition. Chains, as the deliverers of that value, would be more ame-
nable to providing trainees and research materials, and paying a share of costs, than 
are firms under current arrangements.  
5.4. Further research 
This study has identified the need for further research into the projected future role of 
government in the context of (i) the rapidly integrating food supply chain and (ii) the 
dominance of such chains in many countries. In particular, the position of government 
in, or in association with, the supply chain has not been defined. 
 
The social performance of the modern food supply chain has not been defined. Re-
search is necessary to identify existing definitions for the food industry and its associ-
ated markets, and evaluate their suitability for application to the modern food supply 
chain. Having defined performance, research is necessary to identify suitable meas-
ures of performance and practical metrics for their empirical application. Such metrics 
might address short-term issues of efficiency and equity, and also be extended to dy-
namic issues such as innovation and long term resource allocation. 
 
Measurement of the commercial performance of the modern food supply chain is still 
in its early development. An issue raised by many researchers is the lack of value as-
signed to “chain assets”. Experience suggests that imaginative valuation mechanisms 
exist, for example the value of brands or trademarks associated with specific chains, 
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or the present discounted value of streams of value addition due to chain-specific at-
tributes. However, further research is needed to ascertain the needs and means for 
such valuations, and the other implications of formal recognition of chains as a com-
mercial entity. 
 
A fundamental element missing from supply chain analysis is the identification of 
“chain objectives”, that are appropriate to be pursued by all chain members and the 
satisfaction of which can be measured. Separation of chain objectives from firm ob-
jectives would more clearly define the functions firms would want to assign to chains, 
and identification of government objectives that coincide with chain objectives would 
accelerate policy development.  
 
This study has, in conclusion, identified a significant role for certification of supply 
chains’ activities. This has extended to policy objectives surrounding efficiency, eq-
uity, equity issues and social concerns. Research is needed to assess the application of 
existing schemes to an environment dominated by food supply chains, and to identify 
new forms of certification to replace outmoded policy practice elsewhere. 
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